Suppose there are two persons each with limited resources to gain the value of n targets. The targets appear one by one in sequential order. and the value of each tar-get is a random variable X. One of the players has two kinds of resources (high and low) and the other has only one type (middle). Whenever the target arrives with the realized value x, both player either choose one of their cards or pass. If both player choose the card, the one who discards the high wins an amount equal to x. The card chosen in this stage is never used again. This case is a variant of the game Goofspiel discussed by Rnss [2] . We formulate the problem as a two-person zero-sum sequential game and derive a system of recursive equations with some boundary conditions which is solvable in sequence and determines the optimal strategy. A deterministic case is solved completely.
Introduction
We shall consider a t\o70-person zero-sum sequential n-stage game, which is a variant of the card game Goofspiel discussed by Ross [2] .
The game called Goofspiel is played by two players, using a normal deck of cards, as follows. The 13 clubs are first taken out of the deck and of the remaining 39 cards the 13 hearts are given to player I, the 13 diamonds to player 11, and the 13 spades are placed face down in the center. The spades are shuffled and one is turned face up. At this point, the two players choose one of their cards and then simultaneously discard it. The one who discards the higher cards wins from the other an amount equal to the value of the, upturned spade. If both plyl~rs discard the same card, then neither wins. The three cards are then thrown away, a new spade upturned and the game continues.
After 13 plays, there are 110 remaining cards and the game ends. In his paper [2] , if the game is considered under the assumption that player 11 discards his cards in a completely random manner, the best thing for player I to do ls to 156 
© 1980 The Operations Research Society of Japan
Generalized Goofspiel n H and player 11 plays, then player I wins from player 11 an amount equal to x and the game goes to G l (k-l,l,m-l) . The other cases can be described siminlarly. The immediate payoff to player I at this stage is descrided as follows. Even if one of the players passes, when the card is chosen in this stage, it is abandoned and never used again. For instance when player I plays Hand player 11 passes, player I doesn't get a payoff and the game goes to There are two interesting papers related to our model. Sakaguchi [3] treats a special case of this paper where l=0. We use a similar method of that paper. A sequential allocation problem, discussed in Derman, Lieberman and
Ross [1] , includes the caSE! of this paper where l=O and m=n.
In Section 2 we shall derive a fundamental recursive equation by dynamic programming and observe SODle preliminary lemmas. In Section 3 we shall observe the boundary conditions of the recursive equations and obtain the main result of this paper. A simple example in explained. In the last section the game is completely solved in thE~ case of deterministic value of the targets.
Preliminary Lemmas
Let G (k,l,m) be the game described in the previous section. (n,k.l.m) n denote the state of the game where player I has l cards of type Land k cards of type H, and player 11 has m cards of type M and they have n stages to go.
If the target appears with the realized value x, the normalized form of the game G (k,l.m) has the matrix
The meaning of x+G l(k-l. Z.m-l) is that when player I plays H and player 11
Generalized Goo/spiel 159 can be obtained independent of the previous stage. From the definition of the game G (k,l,l~J, this normalized form will be degenerated, Le., when m = n, n player 11 must play at every stages and this form is a column vector, etc.
Denote the value of the game G (k,l,mJ by V (k,l,mJ. Because G (k,l,mJ is n n n a two person zero-sum sequential n-stage game and has perfect recall, we can consider the behavior strategy. When the both players use their first pure strategy and the realized value of the target is x, the immidiate payoff to player I is --x and the game goes to G n _. 1 (k, l-l,m-1J whose value is obtaiIled and
The other cases are considered similarly. So nv (k,l,mJ satisfies the following recursive equation by a dynamic prograrrnning n formulation of the problem.
(1)
The initial eondition of (1) 
where we assume 0 < JJ -E(XJ < 00. We remark that, for n=l, v 1 (k,l,mJ satisfies the following lemmas.
The proof of the following lemmas is easy by induction on n.
The following lemma is trivial by the definition of the game and the fact We note here that these lemmas are intuitively reasonable. The properties
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Boundary Conditions of v (k,l,m)
n First we have to find the boundary conditions of v (k,l,m) for the ren cursive equation (1) . We define the well known function in opportunity analysis,
z and this function is well defined because of 11 < 00 convex and increasing.
Let {g '}1' be a triangu1er array defined by the following recursive
Similarly we define a triangu1er array {h '}1 . ,
Then we get the following lemma. Since the proof of (6) in Lemma 4 is similar to that of Proposition 1 discussed in Sakaguchi [3], we skech the outline of the proof.
Lemma 4. We have
Proof: We use the induction on n. k-1,O,n-1)-v 1(k-1,O,n-1)) . nnn- play a card H
The other cases can be derived similarly.
Concerning the game G (n-Z,Z,n), define a triangular array {p .}O"
Now by lemma land 4, we get that even g . and h . are positive but P . is
not always pClsitive.
Related to the boundary conditions, Lemma 4 and the next two lemmas are considered as a dynamic programming problem where player I is the only decision maker.
Lemma 5. 
We have v (n-Z,Z,n)= f oomax{_x+v l(n-Z,Z-l,n-lJ, x+v l(n-Z-l,Z.n-l)}dP(x)
n 0
By the inductive hypothesis, substitute (9)n_l for the right-hand side of the last equation gettng (9)n. For Z=O and Z=n, we get the equation (9)n by a simple calculation. We get the proof.
Concerning the game G (k,Z,n) we define a following function by n 0;-8 0;-S -(o;+z)F( (0;+z)"-2-)+S(F(T)-1)
o;-S
J (o;+z)!I-2 -xdF(x)
o + J:-s xdF(.-c).
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This function is well defined because of ~ < 00, Let { f } be n, l, k O;;;,k, l;;;,n, k+l;s,n a sequence as follows.
,l ,k
Lemma 6. Proof: We employ the proof by induction on n. For n=l, it is obvious from the definition, We get:, for 1 <k, l<n, . 
, ,
We note: by Lemmas 1 and 2 that
We get, for kin and mIn,
This recursive equation has the solution (11). In fact, substituting (11) 1 n ninto the right-hand side of the equation, we get Use the mixed strategy Use the mixed
Proof: We use the similar method as in Proposition 1. We note,
and, if lln and mln,
n- 
-,J and the optimal strategy for each player is as follows.
Condition
For [ 
Proof: Since the method of the proof is similar to that of Proposition 1., we only skech the outline of the proof.
From the definition, 'lire have the following representation. n-Z,l-l,m-l}-v l(n-l,l-l,m}-v l(n-l-l,Z,m-l}+v l(n-Z-l,Z,m) nnnnand, if ° < l < nand 1 < Tt:' < n, Now we get the following proposition. From this proposition we can obtain the optimal strategy and the value of this game.
Proposition 4. The value of the game, v (k,ZJm}J satisfies the recursive n equation (1) with the boundary condition (6), (7), (9), (10), (ll), (12), (13) and v (OJO,m)=v (kJlJO}=O. When the target has the value x, the optimal stratn n egy for each player is that of the matrix game in the integrand of (1).
Here we poit out the following fact from the calculation of the recursive equation (1) . The optimal strategy of each player is; from the lower value of the target to the high value, the optimal strategy pair changes from (play L, pass), (play L, play M), (pass, play M) to (play H, play M), and for the higher value of the realized value X J both players use the mixed strategy. It Inay be considered that for the relatively small value of a target player 11 wins or passes, for the intermediate value player I wins or passes, and for the higher value both player use the mixed strategy. The similar condition is considered for the lemmas and propositions of this section. Let's consider the case of Proposition 1. In this case, if both player discard, player I always wins from player 11. So player 11 spends his cards for the small values of the targets which are not valuable for player I to win from player 11 and he passes for these values of the targets. For the higher value of the targets, both plyers use the mixed strategy in order to defend the attack of player I for getting these values. When the value is of the intermediate interval, both players play (player I always wins from player 11 ) and these values are thought to be reasonable for both players. The other cases are considered similarly.
Remark that when we consider that X's are independent but not ident:lca11y distributed, the result of lemmas and propositions of Section 2. and 3. go through in a similar manner.
Example. We consider that F(x)=x (x£ [O,l) 
